Blog Post

Kosovo loses €7.5 million of EU funds

  • By Demush Shasha
  • 09 Feb, 2021

In August 2018 Kosovo lost €43.4 million of EU funds. In June 2019 additional €12 million. And now Kosovo lost €7.5 million more. This trend paints a grim prospect of Kosovo potential to benefit from EU funds under IPA III in 2021-2027 where major emphasis will be put on performance of Western Balkans countries in the absorption of EU funds.


In December 2017 Kosovo and EU signed Financing Agreement for the Action Program for Kosovo for the year 2016 – part II – Sector Budget Support.

 

As part of this agreement Kosovo undertook an obligation to implement reforms in public administration, in line with the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and European Reform Agenda (ERA) in view of creating independent, professional and citizens-centered public service. Ministry of Public Administration (later merged with Ministry of Internal Affairs) was appointed as key coordinating body.

 

Kosovo institutions agreed that during 2008-2010 they will implement eight specific reforms in view of advancement of public administration. These reforms would be measured by 33 indicators. On the other hand, EU pledged to reward these reforms with €22 million in direct budget support. This financial support would be disbursed through four financial tranches of €5.5 million each.

 

To put it differently in exchange for implementing the promised reforms Kosovo institutions would receive a €22 million financial boost that they could channel to financial support for businesses, scholarships for youth, construction of schools and hospitals, etc.

 

In 2018 Kosovo had to implement twelve indicators, in 2019 eleven indicators and in 2020 ten indicators. Also, during the entire program duration Kosovo pledged to maintain fulfillment of four basic precondition.

 

In this light, in our latest publication we took stock of the implementation of the 2016 Kosovo – EU sector budget support agreement in the area of public administration.

 

First fix tranche of €5.5 million was not tied to any indicators and was hence disbursed in its entirety. Second tranche was disbursed in the amount of €3.11 million since Kosovo institutions met only 7 out of 12 indicators. Third tranche was disbursed in the amount of only €0.42 million since Kosovo institutions met only 1 out of 11 indicators. Fourth tranche has been postponed to 2021 because of pandemic.

 

Summing up, Kosovo institutions should have met by now 23 specific indicators and receive €16.5 million of EU direct budget support. Instead, Kosovo institutions met only 8 specific indicators and received €9.03 million, loosing thus €7.47 million of EU funds.

 

Latest loss of EU funds is no isolated act. In August 2018 Kosovo EU funds were slashed by €43.4 million and in June 2019 a €12 million hazardous waste facility project was scrapped. These developments depict a worrying trend of the lack of Kosovo political will and administrative capacity for the administration and absorption of EU funds. Under IPA III 2021-2027 even larger emphasis will be placed on the performance capacity of Western Balkans countries. This means that Kosovo might face even greater difficulties in effective absorption of EU funds in the future.

By Demush Shasha June 24, 2021

When worst health crisis the world has ever seen hit Kosovo, the latter turned to the European Union (EU). From political support from the leaders of the EU, keeping borders open for essential health supplies, securing COVID-19 tests and all the way to scientific and administrative support by European Center for Disease Control (ECDC) – Kosovo turned to EU.


Two weeks after first COVID-19 case was registered in Kosovo EU Ambassador in Kosovo, Ms Nataliya Apostolova, was already signing off EU funds that would deliver to Kosovo most essential health supplies needed to absorb the immediate pandemic hit at the health system of Kosovo. As Kosovo politicians were plotting petty political power-games that would eventually make Kosovo the only country in the world to collapse a government in midst of most dangerous pandemic the world has ever seen, the EU secured anything from fully equipped ambulances and respirators, and all the way to hospital beds and patient monitors.

 

Beyond health emergency, and in order to support Kosovo economic recovery, the EU designed a robust financial architecture to support most vulnerable groups of society and ensure macro financial stability of the country. In this light, EU launched a €63 million package of support in grants and €100 million in loans on highly favorable terms. In contrast, Kosovo politicians only achieved to adopt a Law on Economic Recovery after six failed attempts in the Assembly.

 

As the world is trying to return to normality and vaccination is picking up slowly across the globe, it is EU again to the rescue. EU has concluded vaccine contracts with several pharmaceutical companies. In an act of solidarity with Western Balkans, EU allocated €70 million to help fund the access of Western Balkans counties to COVID-19 vaccines procured by EU Member States. Furthermore, Kosovo will get additional 300,000 free vaccines from COVAX of which EU is the largest donor. In the meantime, EU launched a new €7 million project with WHO to support safe and effective vaccination of the populations across the Western Balkans. This project will help prepare the region for the effective reception and administration of COVID-19 vaccines, including those received from COVAX and through the EU vaccine sharing mechanism with EU Member States.

 

It must also be noted that COVID-19 vaccination has turned into global race with strong geopolitical implications. Russia and China have made serious attempts to undermine and challenge US and EU vaccination programs globally. This is also true in the Western Balkans. In this light, EU must take steps to ensure that its dominant footprint in the region remains unsullied.

 

In our latest publication “The only game in town: EU support to Kosovo in fight against COVID-19” we looked into ways and means through which EU has been helping Kosovo to tackle consequences of pandemic. You can download the document under “Publications” section of our webpage.

By Demush Shasha January 30, 2021

Albin Kurti ban from 14 February elections is no isolated act. Latest political and legal plot comes in midst of continuing machinations that have successfully kept Albin Kurti away from power. In Kosovo there is no Putin, but there are many Trump wannabes. That is why Freedom House and Transparency International were obliged to conclude that Kosovo today looks much more like Russia and Belarus and much less like Slovenia and Estonia.  


Alexei Navalny and Albin Kurti share many commonalities. Both are young democratic activists turned politicians, with anti-corruption credo and pro-Western views. Both have proved to be courageous and skilled at organizing mass demonstrations. Both are seen as grassroot politicians that understand and represent general population sentiments and feelings. Navalny is a national symbol in fight against "party of crooks and thieves", just like Kurti is symbol of a country liberation from the “state capture”. Both have been arrested and jailed for their political activism.

 

And from this week they will be sharing one additional commonality - both are being barred from running in election.

 

How did Kosovo a small Western-loving country come to this point? Well, just like in any captured state - it did not happen overnight. It took consistent political will over time to degenerate state institutions and democratic processes, subjugate rule of law institutions, weaken civil society and cripple media independence. This certainly sounds familiar and will goosebump citizens of Russia, Belarus, Serbia and Hungary.

 

Putin, Lukashenko or Vucic did not build consolidated autocratic regimes overnight. Everything started with small “legal” and “procedural” changes that one by one took swing at foundations of civil and democratic life.

 

Just like in Kurti case, in 2018 Russia Presidential elections Putin did not take any dramatic action to ensure that Navalny is barred from elections. Instead, he insisted only that “law” and “procedures” are respected. That was enough to set in motion Frankensteinan state institutions armed with appropriated “laws” and “procedures” that culminated in puppet Central Election Commission to bar Navalny from elections on dubious grounds. Appeal to Supreme Court faced the same fate.

 

Two years later in Belarus Presidential elections, Lukashenko deployed same tactics. Belarus Central Election Commission citing the need to respect “law” and “procedures”, refused on dubious grounds to certify for elections two opposition candidates: Tsepkalo dhe Babaryka. They tried their luck with the Supreme Court appeal but to no avail. When opposition supporters organized demonstrations against the decision they were arrested for the violation of – right, you got it – “law” and “procedures”. Similarly, last year in Serbia when opposition demanded that elections are postponed, President Vucic refused insisting that “constitution” and “laws” must be respected. Hence, today Vucic virtually controls all state institutions and entire national Assembly, without any members from the opposition parties.

 

As you can see a pattern is emerging here – once autocratic leaders gain power, they will use that power to demolish foundations of democratic and civic life through constitutional and legal machinations. In doing so they will bend the rules of the game in their favor, and they will always be smart about it and ensure that it is done border-line legally. Phenomenon has become so widespread that scholars have even coined a name for it: “autocratic legalism”.

 

Back in Pristina we are seeing this play right in front of our eyes. In a series of Kafkaesque institutional steps and legal interpretations, Constitutional Court basically subverted democracy and decided that administrative law on organizing elections supersede country constitution. Following this “original sin” that transformed political plots into legal realities all other state institutions were deployed to ensure that “law” and “procedure” is respected and Kurti barred from the ballot.

 

And this is no isolated act. Latest political and legal plot comes in midst of continuing machinations that have successfully kept Albin Kurti away from power. In Kosovo there is no Putin, but there are many Trump wannabes.

 

Kosovo has been ruled by two political parties for more than a decade, respectively Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). Despite the fact that these two parties were at the beginning at heinous relation they quickly developed an understanding that allowed them to rotate and share power over all state matters. Financial resources were shared, appointments to state institutions were coordinated, decisions on key state assets were consulted and arranged consensually. Simply put there were more things that united them, then brough them apart. This process of state capture was done diligently, slowly and cautiously. And most importantly it was done legally.

 

These realities have obliged both Freedom House and Transparency International to conclude that Kosovo today looks much more like Russia and Belarus and much less like Slovenia and Estonia.

 

Kosovo citizens might soon find themselves in José Saramago fictional novel “Seeing” which turned realities of so many peoples around the world into beautiful piece of literature. In the novel Saramago describes elections where 83% of citizens voted with blank ballot. Their vote was a scream for freedom, justice and prosperity and by the same token protest against rotten political elite. Echoing sentiment of characters in Saramago novel, 58% of youth in Kosovo responded in UNDP Public Pulse that they will likely, or most likely, leave the country in the next three years.

 

Today Albin Kurti represents practically the only opposition in the country, since all other political parties have for quite some time openly united in keeping Kurti away from power. Threat that Kurti represents for political clans that have omnipotently ruled the country is real. During last year early local elections in city of Podujevë, Kurti party won by a landslide and thus flipped a 20 years old LDK bastion. Recent public polls project similar result on a national level. In this light, holding national elections that ban the participation of the leader of the sole opposition party would be appalling. Well, appalling and understandable - desperate politicians resort to desperate tactics.

 

It is difficult to predict what will happen next. Kurti just like Navalny and Belarus opposition, after being barred by Central Election Commission, tried his luck with Supreme Court but to no avail. However, beyond 14 February elections, recent development in Kosovo are another red flag for the state of our democratic society.

 

Today Putin can easily arrest Navalny and 2,000 protesters, just like Lukashenko can build concentration camps for Belarus opposition. Easily because they are merely respecting “laws” and “procedures”. This is now a new reality in Moscow and Minsk. Democracies do not collapse overnight and by a single act, but through countless little steps that slowly makes us acceptable of new, but restrictive, realities. Realities based on “law” and “procedure”. These small and little steps in their entirety give rise to a society where citizens and opposition are deprived of all political and legal tools to fight against what we have created – a democratic monster. A place where your democratic rights are recognized in theory, but there are no practical and legal means through which they can be materialized. To put it differently, state is always on the right side of the law. Citizens find themselves on the other.


Demush Shasha is Executive Director at EPIK.


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